Chinese Militarism, Come What May
Matthew F. Calabria
The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs

Twentieth-century western intellectual commentators on China and its military prowess throughout its post-revolutionary years have shown that prescribing a definitive understanding on the question of its official status has proven elusive, if not enigmatic. Among them, none other than Henry Kissinger remarked, “Of all the great, and potentially great, powers, China is the most ascendant.” The China of today, an unquestioningly fortuitous military establishment, continues to epitomize that description.

The Chinese military, though respected, is becoming a thorn in the side of the world, in part because of its unyielding buildup. The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s military modernization, a prime target of Japanese and U.S. skepticism, has been a chief cause of anxiety in the East Asian region. The question of China’s military capacity is still, and will continue to be, all the rage in Washington, and, especially, Tokyo. A combination of several factors seem to imply that China’s increasing military preparedness should be cause for alarm, especially because of the growing impasse between the Chinese and U.S. militaries’ cooperation.

To give one example, in a nutshell, China has upped the ante on its missile systems technology. Even the weapons systems that have already been released by the cautious and indubitably bureaucratic PLA have proven intimidating. The third-generation PL-9 (Pen Lung, or “Air Dragon”) surface-to-air missile, complete with air-to-air capabilities, is compatible with laser-guided precision and omnidirectional attack, is the latest in Chinese weapons technology. Even the Chinese weapons system itself, utilizing “alpha-numeric service designators” to engage its targets, is strikingly similar to the U.S. model and almost unrecognizable when compared to other world states’ missile system technologies.

Perhaps the biggest bone of contention among American military analysts is China’s nuclear weapons upgrade measures. A statement issued by the Pentagon is certainly the first among the factors detailing the increased concern with the People’s Liberation Army. Its grim May reports on Chinese nuclear modernization has stunned defense analysts, especially the rapid mobilization of its strategic commands. Such an imposition implies that China seeks to maneuver offensively. The PRC has undertaken steps to secure a missile system that enables quicker launching, and is nearly impossible to locate. The ambitions of this year to upgrade to DF-31A missiles, which could be launched from a truck or other mobile station, or JL-2 submarine-class missiles, which are scheduled to be fully operational by at least 2010, have all provoked frustration among the American military commanders. The Chinese themselves openly admit to bolstering their nuclear weapons program as a buffer against the Americans.

If the missile systems and nuclear weapons program are still not enough to convince the wary skeptic of a rise in steady logistical buildups, then the exponential increase from a $20 billion PLA military budget in 2004 to $29.9 billion in 2005 certainly should be. For much of the time during high increase in the budgetary percentage of the PRC’s GDP, the PRC kept it opaque among seemingly high inflation rates, so there may actually still be more liquidity into military affairs than their government lets on.

There are methods and solutions, though none of them boast curbing China’s growing renewal and expenditures. First, the international community needs to focus its aim on curbing the Chinese inclination toward suspicion as well as resorting to offensive counter-stratagems, instead of playing a reactive, secondary role, by keeping its military continually within earshot of the government. An increasingly militarized China will always show signs of distrust of the American military, as it expects an overthrow or at least a curbing of its dynamic progress. Second, the U.S. needs to work far more diligently to facilitate a pragmatic, operable military relationship with the PRC and surrounding region, whether through joint task force operations, or recalibrating its position in the region.

The third solution rests with the PLA itself. A contingent Chinese weapons transparency plan would help in easing concern from their contemporaries, as the Japanese have recently suggested them doing in their annual defense report. In part of that report, Tomhiko Taniguchi, Japan’s foreign minister, asserted that peering into the PLA’s intentions, as well as creating a more fluid weapons and systems management would increase security cooperation. If China is serious about proving to the world that its military ambitions are nothing to be unsettled about, then it should discontinue its policy of reticence as soon as possible, especially if it hopes to gain any carrot-and-stick edges over its regional American counterpart.

A rising tide of PRC militarism is, yet again, accounting for a strain in U.S.-Sino relations. As Morgenthau noted, “the art of diplomacy is…transformed into a variety of warfare.” With a power as great as China, flexing muscles and applying military pressure cannot win the battle. Only by engaging in frequent, cutting dialogue with the PRC can the U.S. now hope to evade a costly military provocation in the near, much less distant, future.