Italy: A look at Regionalism in the European Union
By Molly Jennings
Hypothesis
Multi-level governance in European Union member states forces the supranational, national, and regional levels to work together to achieve favorable policy outcomes. In Italy, the devolution of powers from the national to the regional level has been a long process, hastened along by the influence of EU regional policy. Regionalism, defined as “social demands in regions for greater autonomy from the central institutions of their state,” is relatively strong in Italy. However, Italy’s regional governments vary in their social, economic, political, and cultural contexts. There are marked differences in the institutional strength of the regions, most strikingly between the north and the south.
This paper tests two hypotheses, which seek to determine the degree of regional autonomy in Italy and the forces that influence it, focusing on the planning and implementation of structural fund projects in Italy from 1985 to the present. For a region, autonomy is defined as “the right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs.” The EU structural funds are financial instruments managed by the Commission, which are employed in the regions of the EU member states in order to achieve economic and social cohesion, while reducing the gap between the more advanced and the economically depressed regions The EU budget for 2000-2006 is €213 billion, of which €195 billion is allocated to structural funding, and €19 billion is allocated to cohesion funding. Cohesion funding differs from structural funding. Italy is not eligible to participate in the cohesion fund, created by the Commission in February 1992, because Italy’s GDP per capita is not less than 90% of the EU average.
The research hypothesis is that “the interaction of Italy’s regional governments and the EU is promoting the relative autonomy of the regions.” The independent variable is “the interaction of the Italian regional governments and the EU” and the dependent variable is “the relative autonomy of the regions within Italy.” The research hypothesis represents the regional level of analysis.
If the research hypothesis is true, we would expect the evidence to show two things. First, Italy’s regions actively and successfully seek direct funding from the EU for economic development, in such areas as tourism, local food and beverage production, and other local economic activities. Second, the regional governments actively seek to control how EU money is spent and succeed in limiting central government controls, and local politics within each region ultimately determine how EU money is spent in the regions.
The alternative hypothesis is that “Italy’s central government is acting, in its domestic policies and in its relations to the EU, to limit the relative autonomy of the regions.” The independent variable is “the Italian government” and the dependent variable is “the relative autonomy of the regions within Italy.” The alternative hypothesis represents the national level of analysis.
If the alternative hypothesis is true, we would expect the evidence to show two things. First, Italy’s central government actively seeks to influence EU decisions concerning the regions. Second, the central government effectively controls how the regions disburse EU money, and national political decision-makers ultimately determine how Italy’s regions use EU funds.
The Italian regions of Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia in the north, and Sicilia and Sardegna in the south (Mezzogiorno) are test cases for the hypotheses. These regions were selected for several reasons: to compare “ordinary” and “special statute” regions, to compare weak and strong institutional regions, and to compare northern and southern regions. Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia are “ordinary” regions, whose regional constitutions were drafted in 1970. Sicilia and Sardegna are “special statute” regions, whose regional constitutions were drafted in 1948. A region’s ability to make efficient use of the EU structural funding is dependent on that region’s institutional strength. Emilia-Romagna and Lombardia are considered strong institutional regions. Sicilia and Sardegna are considered weak institutional regions. In his experiment, conducted between 1978 and 1985, Robert Putnam determined that the northern Italian regions exhibited above-average institutional performance, and the Mezzogiorno regions exhibited below-average institutional performance. Emilia-Romagna exhibited the highest level of institutional performance and Lombardia was an above-average institutional performer. Sicilia and Sardegna were both below average institutional performers, but Sardegna performed slightly better than Sicilia.
Putnam concluded this study twenty years ago, but the results remain salient for the 2000-2006 structural funding period. Structural fund projects in the Mezzogiorno region have been hampered by the lack of institutional strength exhibited in the region, characterized by few innovative business services, inadequate transport networks and infrastructures, difficulty obtaining credit, limited availability of operational industrial zones, lack of public trust in governmental institutions, and the presence of organized crime networks. Recently, Sardegna has performed well relative to the other Mezzogiorno regions. However, like other Mezzogiorno regions, Sardegna has often been characterized by a weak institutional structure due to its “amoral familism,” which refers to an inability to work together for a common goal that is beyond the interest of one’s own family. The regions of the center and north have actively utilized EU structural funds, especially to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

II. Literature Review
Several scholars have studied aspects of my topic, such as Italian regionalism, the regional level of the EU, Europeanization, the history of Italian regional policy, and the EU structural funds. However, I have not come across another source that seeks to determine what forces affect regional autonomy in Italy. The most useful source for studying this topic was Multi-level Governance and Institutional Change: The Europeanization of Regional Policy in Italy by Enrico Gualini, which seeks to determine the effect of Europeanization on Italian politics, focusing on EU regional and cohesion policy, within the perspective of multi-level governance. . He defines Europeanization as the responses by actors and institutions to European integration processes, such as EU structural funding. His study differs from mine in several ways. First, he focuses on domestic politics, while I focus on the relationship between the Italian national and regional actors and the EU, as well as the relationship between the Italian national and regional authorities. Second, he focuses on Europeanization, while I focus on regional autonomy.
Over the course of my study I encountered several research barriers. First, I couldn’t utilize the sources which I planned to use due to my lack of Italian fluency: the regional and Italian government websites and the websites of the managing authorities for the structural fund projects were not accessible in English. Second, there is a dearth of available English-language literature, in terms of books and journal articles, addressing my topic. Third, I did not have the opportunity to conduct field research in Italy which I would have used to determine whether the Italian governmental or regional authorities initiated and drafted the structural fund project applications. However, lack of Italian fluency may have hindered my field-research abilities. Fifth, the Europa server was useful for obtaining information about structural fund projects that the Commission had approved, but these documents did not specify how the applications came into force, how the projects were drawn up, or which level of government initiated the projects. According to an EU representative, this information is not available through the Europa server. As per the EU representative’s suggestion, I emailed the project managing authorities, asking which level of government sent in the application for that specific project. I received no responses.
III. Testing the Research Hypothesis
There is evidence to support the first expectation of the research hypothesis, that “Italy’s regions actively and successfully seek direct funding from the EU for economic development, in such areas as tourism, local food and beverage production, and other local economic activities.” The EC created the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in 1985 to improve the socio-economic structure of economically depressed areas in the southern member states, through the application of structural funding. Emilia-Romagna lobbied the Commission and Rome for the right to participate in this program demonstrating their desire to secure EU structural funding for economic development projects. The regions of the center and north have consistently sought a stronger role in the EU’s decision-making process with regard to the structural funds. This reflects their institutional strength.
In 1997, the University of Catania in Sicilia received EU structural funding for a project to help preserve Catania’s cultural heritage The Commission contributed €17, 485, 148 from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund under Objective 1 which the University used to covert old buildings into museums. The ERDF and the ESF are EU structural funds that finance different types of projects for developing the regions. The ESF, established in 1958, finances projects supporting measures to promote employment. The ERDF, established in 1975, finances projects that promote economic and social cohesion through productive investment, infrastructure improvement, and the development of (SMEs). Objective 1 regions have a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the EU average, which includes Sicilia and Sardegna.
On 22 October 2003, Sicilia brought action against the Commission before the Court of First Instance regarding the Commission’s 13 August 2003 cancellation of an ERDF contribution supporting the “Porto Empedocle Major Project.” The region of Sicilia fought back against the Commission to reclaim the money allotted to the project, and to realize the full benefit that the project was beginning to bring to the region. This is an example of a regional attempt to secure EU structural funding to finish a development project.
There is evidence to contradict the first expectation of the research hypothesis. The Mezzogiorno regions often did not develop their own plans for the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, which were instead the work of external consultants. It is not clear, however whether this was due to lack of initiative on the part of the Mezzogiorno regions, or a reluctance by Rome to devolve more decision-making power to the regions. Regardless of Sicilia’s desire to keep the structural funding allotted to the “Porto Empedocle Major Project,” Sicilia was not successful in keeping this funding long enough to complete the project, because the Commission withdrew the funds.
There is evidence to support the second expectation of the research hypothesis, that “the regional governments actively seek to control how EU money is spent and succeed in limiting central government controls, and local politics within each region ultimately determine how EU money is spent in the regions.”
The Intervento Straordinario, Rome’s development plan for the Mezzogiorno from 1950 to 1992, financed by Italian state aid, rather than EU structural funds, provides a context for the projects undertaken by the structural funds, by showing how the relationship between Rome and the regions has progressed since 1950. The 1992 termination of the Intervento Straordinario was influenced by several factors including the liberalization and privatization efforts being undertaken by Rome to reform the welfare state. The termination was also related to the Europeanization of Italian regional policy, which had begun in 1985 with the launch of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. This termination gave the Mezzogiorno regions more control over the planning and allocation of EU structural funds.
The regions acted as managing authorities for the Integrated Mediterranean Programme projects under the supervision of a central government committee called the Department for Community Policies. The managing authority, named by the member state, is a very important part of the structural fund process because it implements the projects and documents the actions taken in support of those projects.36 The managing authority is also involved in choosing which projects are sent to the Commission for selection. By setting up communication networks with both the central administration and the EU, Emilia-Romagna established an effective implementation process for the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. The Emilia-Romagna regional administration developed plans for the projects and managed the sub-programs. Other regions set up informal contacts with the Commission in order to discuss the content of the programs and secure up-to-date information. This shows a desire by the regions to have say in the implementation of structural fund projects and a willingness by Rome to appoint a managing authority at the regional level.
Several Objective 1 projects have been carried out under the supervision of regional managing authorities. The responsibility for selecting projects for the “2000-2006 Objective 1 Development Plan” was delegated by Rome to the Objective 1 regions. The Regional Programming Centre of Sardegna was appointed managing authority for the “Regional Operational Programme for Sardegna” of 15 December 2004. The Regional Programming Directorate of the Presidency of the Sicilian Region was appointed managing authority for the “Regional Operational Programme for Sicilia” of 15 December 2004.
Several Objective 2 projects have also been carried out under the supervision of regional authorities. Objective 2 refers to regions facing major changes in the industrial, services, and fisheries sectors, regions with declining rural areas, and regions with disadvantaged urban areas. Support for Objective 2 regions is drawn from the ERDF and ESF funds. The “Objective 2 Programme for Emilia-Romagna” of 14 November 2001 was carried out by a regional managing authority and a regional payment authority. The “Objective 2 Programme for Lombardia” of 10 December 2001 was carried out by a regional managing authority and a regional payment authority. The payment authority, appointed by the member state, is charged with ensuring that the intended beneficiaries receive their allocated funds in a timely manner. The Commission decides which projects will be funded, the Council determines the Structural Fund budget, and the payment authority facilitates the transfer of this money.
Several Interreg III projects have also been carried out under the supervision of regional managing authorities. Interreg III projects are Community Initiative programs financed by the ERDF. Community Initiative programs fall under the aegis of the structural funds and are formulated by the Commission with the goal of realizing sustainable development in the EU. Interreg III projects finance interregional cooperation projects. The “A” strand of Interreg III focuses on projects relating to cross-border cooperation. The Giunta Regionale di Lombardia was appointed managing authority for the “Interreg III A – Italy/Switzerland” project of 12 September 2001. The giunta regionale is the executive of the region, charged with running the regional administration. The Presidenza della Regione Siciliana was appointed managing authority for the “Interreg III A – Italy/Malta” project of 8 December 2004. The Regione Autonoma Sardegna was appointed managing authority for the “Interreg III A – Italy/French Islands” project of 18 December 2001.
Several Urban II projects have also been carried out under the supervision of regional managing authorities. Urban II projects are financed by the ERDF. According to Michel Barnier, former Regional Policy Commissioner, the Urban programs are “characterised by their creative and innovative approach to urban regeneration.” The Comune (municipality) di Milano was appointed managing authority for the “Urban II Milano” program of 23 November 2001. The Comune di Misterbianco, Sicilia, was appointed managing authority for the “Urban II Misterbianco” program, approved by the Commission on 17 January 2002. Commenting on Urban II Misterbianco, Commissioner Barnier stated that the Urban programmes have “a strong grassroots emphasis, involving local people at all stages in the decision making process, to which the programme for Misterbianco is no exception.” The Comune di Misterbianco strove to use the € 25 million provided for the program to improve the natural and business environments of Misterbianco, and to take the necessary measures to promote the inclusion of disadvantaged groups in the labor market. Urban II is the follow-up program to Urban I for the structural funds programming period from 2000 to 2006.
Evidence exists to contradict the second expectation of the research hypothesis, but was not accessible.
The evidence is mixed regarding the expectations of the research hypothesis. Some of the evidence is consistent with the expectations of the hypothesis, while some is inconsistent.
IV. Testing the Alternative Hypothesis
There is evidence to support the first expectation of the alternative hypothesis that “Italy’s central government actively seeks to influence EU decisions on the regions.” This implies that the central government seeks to get EU Structural Funds committed to the Italian regions. In November 2003, the Italian Economy Ministry called on the EU to commit €4 billion in structural funds to improve the development of the Mezzogiorno. The incentive exists for Rome to have a role in controlling the allocation of EU funds because as of 2003, the Italian Economy Ministry relied on the EU structural funds to account for 50% of the money needed to develop the Mezzogiorno. During the policy-making process, Rome often refuses to cooperate with the regions because it views them as antagonistic.
Between 1989 and 1993, Rome took a centralist approach toward developing structural fund projects for the regions of the Mezzogiorno, by proposing the same development plan for all eight regions of the Mezzogiorno, failing to target the specific needs of each region. Centralist is defined as “advocating the consolidatation of power under the central government, which facilitates dictating to the regions, rather than collaboration, and would be considered unacceptable in a federal society.” The Commission lobbied Rome to allow for more effective participation by the Mezzogiorno regions in this policy-making process, by modifying the amount of finance devoted to the multiregional and regional levels.
There is evidence to contradict the first expectation of the alternative hypothesis. By the late 1980s, the regions played a key role in drafting the projects to be financed by the structural funds. At the EU bargaining table, the Italian government does not flex its muscle regarding structural funds and their reforms.
There is evidence to support the second expectation of the alternative hypothesis, that “the central government effectively controls how the regions disburse EU money, and national political decision-makers ultimately determine how Italy’s regions use EU funds.” By the late 1980s, the regions had been given jurisdiction over their own economic development, but had little ability to control ERDF expenditure in their regions because Rome processed the structural fund applications necessary to receive financing from the ERDF. To receive structural funding for a project, an application must be sent to the Commission by a member state government or region. It is not clear from the research whether Rome or the regions are responsible for drafting the structural fund applications.
The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, a highly centralized state agency, was appointed managing authority by Rome for the Intervento Straordinario. The termination of the Intervento Straordinario in 1992 was followed by a new policy framework, which entrusted the Ministry of Budgeting with the position of managing authority for all of the projects directed toward the Mezzogiorno regions. This shows that Rome’s approach to the allocation of EU structural funds to the Mezzogiorno regions was still centralist in nature even after efforts to decentralize, which the termination of the Intervento Straordinario symbolized.
During the 1988 to 1992 structural fund programming period, Rome developed a single regional development plan for all of the Objective I Italian regions of the Mezzogiorno, instead of a plan for each region. The Commission viewed this as a strategy by the central government to retain control over the allocation of structural funding in Italy. The Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport was appointed managing authority for the “Interreg III B – Western Mediterranean” program of 8 December 2004, which concerned a number of Italian regions including Sardegna, Sicilia, Emilia-Romagna, and Lombardia. The “B” strand of Interreg III focuses on projects relating to transnational cooperation. Rome often refuses to cooperate with the regions during the structural fund project implementation process because it views those regions as antagonistic. The Commission lobbied Rome to allow for more effective participation by the Objective 1 regions in the project implementation process.
The following Objective 1 Operational Programmes concerning the Mezzogiorno regions were carried out under the supervision of national managing authorities. The Servizio Pianificazione e Programmazione del Ministero dei Trasporti e della Navigazione was appointed managing authority for the “Operational Programme for Transport” of 8 November 2001. The Dipartimento Pubblica Sicurezza del Ministero dell’Interno was appointed managing authority for the “Security for the development of the Mezzogiorno” project of 13 September 2000. The Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica was appointed managing authority for the “Operational Programme for Research” of 8 August 2000. The Ministero delle Attività Produttive was appointed managing authority for the “Operational Programme for Local Development” of 8 August 2000. The Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze was appointed managing authority for the “Operational Programme for Technical Assistance” of 22 March 2001. The Ministero dell’Istruzione dell’Università e della Ricerca was appointed managing authority for the “Operational Programme for Education and Training: La scuola per lo sviluppo” of 22 August 2000.
There is evidence to contradict the second expectation of the alternative hypothesis. The “Community Support Framework Mezzogiorno Development Plan” of 2000 gives the Mezzogiorno regions the authority to manage the allocation of 70% of the total EU funds allocated to the Mezzogiorno between 2000 and 2006. This power distribution is a departure from the previous management of the Mezzogiorno regions under the highly centralized agency called the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Community Support Frameworks are economic development projects tailored to specific member states and regions. Following the termination of the Intervento Straordinario in 1992, the regional actors were established by Rome as equal partners in the new decentralized system of responsibilities, which reflected Rome’s willingness to entrust regional actors with a better regional managing capacity.
The evidence is mixed regarding the expectations of the alternative hypothesis. Some of the evidence is consistent with the expectations of the hypothesis, while some is inconsistent.
V. Conclusions
The research hypothesis is slightly more supported than the alternative hypothesis. Relative to the research hypothesis, there are twelve instances of supporting evidence, and two instances of contradictory evidence. Relative to the alternative hypothesis, there are twelve instances of supporting evidence, and four instances of contradictory evidence.
There are twelve instances of supportive evidence relative to the expectations of the research hypothesis: four for the first expectation and eight for the second expectation. There are twelve instances of supportive evidence relative to the expectations of the alternative hypothesis: five for the first expectation and seven for the second expectation.
There are two instances of contradictory evidence relative to the expectations of the research hypothesis, two for the first expectation, and none for the second expectation. There are four instances of contradictory evidence relative to the expectations of the alternative hypothesis: two for both the first and second expectations.
Regarding the research hypothesis, when the instances of contradictory evidence are subtracted from the instances of supportive evidence, the number achieved is ten. Regarding the alternative hypothesis, when the instances of contradictory evidence are subtracted from the instances of supportive evidence, the number achieved is eight. These calculations lead to the conclusion that the research hypothesis is slightly more supported than the alternative hypothesis.
The evidence is mixed regarding the expectations of the research and alternative hypotheses. Some of the evidence is consistent with the expectations of the hypotheses, while some is inconsistent.
The evidence is mixed regarding the expectations of the research hypothesis. Several themes can be drawn from the evidence that is consistent with the first expectation of the research hypothesis. One theme is that the EU seeks to use structural funding to decrease the gap between the advanced and the underdeveloped regions. The EU demonstrated this desire in the launch of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in 1985. The Programmes improved the socio-economic structure of certain regions in the southern member states through the application of structural funding to economically depressed areas. In 1997, the EU also supported the province of Catania, Sicilia, through structural funding which has helped to improve the economy of this underdeveloped area: EU funding has spurred a tourist boom in the area, which has continued to benefit the local economy.
A second theme is that strong institutional regions, specifically Emilia-Romagna, seem to seek more control over the structural fund projects than the weak institutional regions of Sicilia and Sardegna, and relative to Lombardia.
No discernible theme can be drawn from the evidence that is inconsistent with the first expectation of the research hypothesis, because the evidence is insufficient to warrant such a statement.
A pattern can be drawn from the evidence that is consistent with the second expectation of the research hypothesis. The regional governments have some control over how EU money is spent because they have been given authoritative power, as either managing or payment authorities, for a number of projects under the aegis of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, Objective 1 and Objective 2, and the Community Initiatives Interreg III and Urban II.
No theme can be drawn from the evidence that is inconsistent with the second expectation of the research hypothesis, because there is no evidence to contradict this expectation.
The evidence is mixed regarding the expectations of the alternative hypothesis. Several themes can be drawn from the evidence that is consistent with the first expectation of the alternative hypothesis. One theme is that in the past, Rome has taken a centralist approach to the development of the Mezzogiorno. For instance, between 1989 and 1993, Rome took a centralist approach toward developing structural fund projects for the regions of the Mezzogiorno, by proposing the same development plan for all eight regions of the Mezzogiorno, failing to target the specific needs of each region.
A second theme is that Rome appears reluctant to cooperate with the regions during the planning process for the structural funds, or to devolve any more policy-planning powers to the regional level. For instance, in 1993 the Commission lobbied Rome to allow for more effective participation by the Mezzogiorno regions in the structural fund planning process, which suggests that Rome does not adequately include the regions in this process.
No discernible theme can be drawn from the evidence that is inconsistent with the first expectation of the alternative hypothesis, because the evidence is insufficient.
Several themes can be drawn from the evidence that is consistent with the second expectation of the alternative hypothesis. One theme is that project-implementation power is not as effective for fostering regional autonomy if the regions do not have project-planning power. For instance, by the late 1980s, the regions had been given jurisdiction over their own economic development, but had little ability to control ERDF expenditure in their regions because Rome processed the structural fund applications necessary to receive financing from the ERDF.
A second theme is that Rome appears reluctant to relinquish control over the allocation of structural funding in Italy. For instance, during the 1988 to 1992 structural fund programming period, Rome developed a single regional development plan for all of the Objective I Italian regions of the Mezzogiorno, instead of a plan for each region.
No discernible theme can be drawn from the evidence that is inconsistent with the second expectation of the alternative hypothesis, because the evidence is insufficient.
The research and alternative hypotheses are complementary because both scenarios can co-exist. The EU and Rome both influence the degree of autonomy within the regions. Different bodies can have a different impact on the same region. It is equally possible for the interaction of Italy’s regional governments and the EU to promote the relative autonomy of the regions, as it is for Rome’s interactions with the EU and the regions to limit the relative autonomy of the regions.
The evidence suggests that the situation in Italy represents a middle ground between the scenarios introduced by the hypotheses, for several reasons. First, the evidence neither fully supports nor completely negates the hypotheses. Second, the research hypothesis was only slightly more supported than the alternative hypothesis.
VI. Recommendations
Italian political leaders are currently preparing for a referendum on the “Devolution Bill,” which would devolve more powers to the regions and transform the Senate into a federal legislative body. The bill is the pet project of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, and is heavily supported by Umberto Bossi and the Lega Nord. The centre-left opposition, led by new Prime Minister Romano Prodi, is fiercely opposed to the bill and plans to challenge it when it is put to a referendum. Prime Minister Prodi should allow passage of the bill because further decentralization from Rome to the regional level will be beneficial for Italy’s economic development. For instance, it makes more sense for the regional authorities, rather than the Italian government authorities, to oversee a regional development project.

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