The Russian Presidency and the 1993 Constitution: The Birth of Superpresidentialism?

By Stephen Ryan

The question of whether the institution of the Russian Presidency is too strong or too weak under the 1993 Constitution is misleading because it implies that there is an either/or answer, when in fact the reality is more complex. Though on paper the system is not nearly “superpresidential,” the practices that have developed since the ratification of the 1993 Constitution, and in particular since the 2003 parliamentary elections, have underscored the fact that the power of the President far outstrips the other two branches of government. If there are any problems with the current Constitution, it is the absolute weakness of the Federal Assembly.
Thomas Remington, author of one of the definitive textbooks on the post-Soviet political structure of Russia, notes that the Russian President, beyond his formal powers outlined in the Russian Constitution, possesses a great deal of informal power, from his offices in the Kremlin to a staff even larger than the President of the United States. He also notes that the informal power was exploited by both Yeltsin and Putin, who have each attempted to build a cult of personality in order to enhance their abilities to dictate governance entirely out of the Executive Branch. Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Constitutional Court in 1993 is a clear example of his desires for personal power, rather than infusing the office with power.
The example David Remnick gives in an article entitled “The Banker, the President, and the President’s Guard” of Chief of Presidential Security Gen. Aleksandr Korzhakov’s raid against Vladimir Gusinsky, one of the richest men in Russia during the mid-1990s and a constant thorn in the side of the Yeltsin administration, and the subsequent dismissal of FSK head Yevgeny Sevostyanov by presidential decree is a perfect example of the informal powers of the president and the weakness of the institutions of the state to resist his controls. This, unlike the above example, points to the importance of the development of strong institutions by those committed to the strength of their institutions, not just their own personal power. John Dunlop, in a March 1996 analysis of resurgent imperial nationalism in the Yeltsin administration, ties the incident to the “party of war’s” efforts to stall reform and bring back an authoritarian style of rule. What is telling about this episode, with its elevations and demotions of reformist and hawkish officials, is the degree of influence that one group of appointed officials in the presidential administration had over national policy regarding the economy and Chechnya, and how this altered the country’s policy entirely, pointing again to the informal strength of the Russian presidency. The Duma was never once mentioned in Dunlop’s fairly comprehensive account - it is as if they were not a part of the government at all.
Furthermore, the Presidential administration has the right to organize itself without being subject to oversight from the legislature. This is the one substantial omission from the powers of the State Duma that strips it of a great deal of potential power. This contributes to both the formal and informal power of the President – like both Yeltsin and Putin, the President is able to organize the entirety of the Executive Branch, including the Security Council, as he sees fit. The Duma and Federation Council, like most every young legislature and many old legislatures, lack powerful standing committees that have the power of subpoena to oversee the organization of the Executive Branch. With the 2003 parliamentary elections and the overwhelming majority gained by the Unity bloc, the complacency of the Duma has become even more apparent.
In conclusion, the major failing of the 1993 Constitution is not the powers imbued in the Office of the President, which while strong, are no stronger than many successful democracies like the French 5th republic. Grigory Yavlinsky, the head of the pro-democracy Yabloko political party, writes of the need of ordinary Russians to take part in the path that the country takes in the years to come. He is indeed correct, but the manner in which it needs to happen is through the State Duma and Federation Council taking their role in the future of Russia seriously. If democracy is to seriously take root under the current Constitution, its non-Presidential institutions must develop real power under the guidance of leaders who take such power seriously. Thereby, it is not the presidency itself that it is too strong but the Federal Assembly that is formally too weak, allowing the informal powers of the president free rein.

The author is the Chair of the International Affairs Society.