The European Union Constitution is largely defunct; at least for now. President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso recently stated that the EU is not likely to have a constitution in the next two to three years in order to provide the 25-member Union time to reflect on the recent and largely unsurprising rejection of the document by various member states.

The importance of the Constitution, however, should still remain an issue for the United States and the Bush administration. Recently, both President George Bush and Secretary of State Condaleezza Rice endorsed the Constitution and its future. Thus far in President Bush’s second term, a key priority for his administration’s foreign policy has been to foster a better relationship with Europe by attempting to strengthen the United States’ alliance with the EU. This is largely because they correctly recognize that Europe’s growing influence in the international community is becoming critical to advancing long-term American interests on the world stage. These interests include, but are certainly not limited to, the rising tension over North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, China and its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, as well as growing anti-Americanism in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The proposed EU Constitution is now being re-worked and re-negotiated to fix the problems that caused its demise. What is important to note is that the issue of an EU Constitution is not going to dissipate any time soon. The original document was signed less than a year ago and was expected to be ratified within two years. Due to its failure in France and the Netherlands, however, the ratification process was delayed. President Barroso insisted in late September that the EU should not be nostalgic over the constitution and that the Commission will continue to work to demonstrate the legitimacy and relevance of both the EU and a written constitution. A possible scenario that could now emerge is a multi-faceted Europe where some countries, Germany and France in particular, may opt for closer political union in general, while traditional US allies such as Britain could form an outer core of EU members with looser political ties to Brussels. Washington should be wary of any such outcome, which would merely allow a stronger core of committed and loyal EU member states to promote an agenda that further opposes the US with less opportunity for Britain to interject.

The implications for US policy are tremendous in the face of a strengthened and unified European Union that is organized under a single constitution. The constitution would strengthen European foreign policy by creating a single EU foreign minister. Assuming the constitution was eventually ratified, the importance of increased EU strength coupled with an ability to speak with a single voice on foreign policy issues would have potentially devastating consequences for US interests abroad. Recently, the United States has found itself in conflict with several European countries not only over issues such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, but also a recent EU proposal to strip the United States of control over the internet by establishing a global body to govern its implementation and regulation.

It is also disenchanting to imagine the effect on American interests if Europe as a whole extended its reach further into the security and foreign policy realm. If the common European security and foreign policy had functioned in 2003 when the US was starting the war in Iraq, it is possible that Belgium, France, or Greece—all countries where public opinion is strikingly anti-American—could have prevented the UK, Poland, or Italy from aiding America in its already loosely-affiliated coalition, producing an even larger burden on the US economy and world-wide reputation.

A wide-range of conflicts that currently exist over global warming, economic reform, or even international debt relief could potentially become more exacerbated if the United States were opposed by a unified 25-member bloc that spoke as one entity on issues of international importance. Given that the two sides have repeatedly clashed in recent years makes the potential EU Constitution all the more important. The United States in general and the Bush Administration in particular have a vested interest in a weaker EU, not a stronger one. This does not mean that administration officials should overtly denounce the document, but traveling to various EU capitals complimenting and implicitly promoting it, are in the very least, antithetical to US interests.

Instead, the Bush administration should take a cautionary, noncommittal tone with regard to European Union cohesion and expansion. Such an approach certainly does not include praising the efforts of constitutional development by arguing it will make Europe “stronger, richer and more efficient” as President Bush did when he met with the American ambassador to the EU. The United States should make an effort to reconcile differences with the EU member states independently in order to prevent a collective movement against US interests abroad.

It is important to recognize that the European Union is growing in strength and influence and the adoption of a constitution is merely a matter of time. Whether it occurs in three years or twenty, it is important for America to recognize that future European strength will be a check on US power, prestige, and influence, all of which will affect relations with China, Iran, North Korea, and many Middle Eastern states.