Countering Putin’s Gambit

It is a realist aphorism that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The fall of the Soviet Union left more than a dozen weak and... By Adam Solove and Alison M. Fincher

 

From November 2004

It is a realist aphorism that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The fall of the Soviet Union left more than a dozen weak and struggling states without a clear political future. Now their fate hangs not on the will of their people, or even with the international community, but in the competition of regional powers.

The Beslan school massacre in September 2003 was a horrific wake-up call for Russian citizens. Yet recent measures taken by President Vladimir Putin have little to do with fighting terrorism. The President’s planned changes to the Duma, his abolition of the local election of governors, and his newly assumed power over the judiciary all hint at the frailty of democracy in the country.

Simultaneously, Russia’s foreign policy is increasingly focused on aid to its immediate neighbors. The Single Economic Space, which unites the economies of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, has become a new forum for Moscow to exert power over the former Soviet states. The increasing role played by Russia in the political and international affairs of these nations sets a dangerous precedent for a revived Russian sphere of dominance.

Influence over Ukraine’s large Russian minority has given Moscow control over the country’s upcoming Presidential elections. Putin has actively campaigned for current Prime Minister Yanukovych, who has proposed dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship and the use of Russian as a national language. More importantly, he supports a plan of non-alignment, which would end plans for Ukraine to join NATO.

Russia has also created dependence through economic power. The Belarusian economy depends on Russian energy sold at far below market price. At the same time, Russia is serving as an important transportation link for new energy producers in the Caspian Sea region desperate to export their valuable oil.

Far from struggling to regain its lost power, Moscow has instead found its neighbors willing to accept its larger regional role. Further regional integration allows Moscow to speak for the region in larger forums. The Single Economic Space would give Russia the effective power to negotiate with the full weight of its neighbors and act as spokesman for developing countries.

Russia has taken on the role of interfering in regional disputes to curry the favor of allies, some traditional and some new. As Uzbek President Islam Karimov recently pointed out, Putin’s “every visit … means solutions to problems.” Moscow’s new popularity may be due in part to the alternative it provides for developing countries.

European countries are forced to bend over backwards to meet European Union standards while Central Asian states can sense the instability of America’s democratic ward, Afghanistan. In contrast, the new Russian sphere is more pro-active in its recruitment and less judgmental toward authoritarianism and centrally-planned economies.

It would be wrong to say that Russia and its neighbors are slipping into “old habits” from the days of the Soviet Union. Indeed, doing so may mask the far more important concern, that new forms of authoritarian political and economic control are not vestiges of the old system, but signs of a newly-evolving one. The new composite features markets but also government-owned industry; limited elections, but also centralized power; and multilateral, but still fundamentally self-interested foreign policies. This represents a new and less abrasive answer for ruling the impoverished and divided regions of Eastern Europe and Central Asia once under Soviet totalitarianism.

The reflexive answer of Western politicians is an appeal for democracy and human rights, coupled with the offer of generous trade packages. What will entice these governments, however, are not vague promises aimed at appeasing marginally-interested Westerners. Incremental reform will come only through the demonstration that free countries can survive in traditionally-unstable regions. Instead of trade packages, the West should invest in limiting Russia’s power by patiently providing expertise and limited resources to help struggling nations achieve viability and independence.

Building stable and modern nations in the former Soviet Union seems like a purely humanitarian goal, yet it is also serves America’s own national interest. Ending these troubled states’ dependence will cost far less in the long-run than interminable, ineffectual aid or competition with other powers.

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