There have been many intended and unintended effects of President Bush’s crusade against Weapons of Mass Destruction - in a land where crusades tend to elicit rather negative images. Nowhere are these consequences more serious for traditional state-state relations than the tense Northeast Asian region.

Bush’s presidency ushered in a new era for U.S.-Asian relations. The hard-line approach employed by Bush with North Korea received much press coverage. So too did the bellicose rhetoric directed toward China. Most analysts viewed the new American approach toward China as a concession to Taiwan. Bush’s since-retracted support for a “Two China” policy, and, more importantly, his sale of advanced weapons systems to Taiwan early in his term, have only buttressed this claim.

While this column does not necessarily contradict this analysis, another more subtle explanation for Bush’s revamped Asia policy focuses on an often forgotten nation. For many Japanese, American actions in East Asia are motivated by one of two inspirations: being Pro-China or being Pro-Japan. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, in this binary system, supported China. After years of forbidding Japan from normalizing relations with China, Nixon, without consulting Tokyo, surprised the world with his recognition of communist country in 1972. Also during this time Japan and U.S. first began to have serious tiffs over trade.

Ronald Reagan changed course. Relations with Japan improved markedly. Indeed, Reagan’s charm helped cement a highly personal and friendly relationship between him and Japan’s Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone. So close was the bond that it assumed its own name, the Ron-Yasu match.

Yet as President Clinton took power, with an anti-Japan Congress and populist-style resentment at a still-strong Japanese economy, tides again began to favor China (even as Clinton ran for president on an anti-China platform). Clinton’s pro-China policy heightened Japan’s awareness of its own insecurity. The Cold War’s end reduced the traditional need for U.S. soldiers to be stationed in Japan (as well as in Europe, Korea, and elsewhere). That America would leave Japan to its own defenses - and embrace China in Japan’s stead - caused Japanese domestic consternation.

Today most Japanese feel President Bush has “chosen” Japan. In other words, the pendulum has swung back into Tokyo’s favor. People again talk of an executive relationship, this time the George-Jun[‘ichiro Koizumi] bond.

Now we return to Iraq. Bush’s demands that Japan send its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Baghdad to aid U.S. troops are inducing disquiet all throughout the region. Since the beginning of the War on Terror, Japan’s government has shown great speed in overcoming overcome its post-war aversion to all things military. Cruise ships sent to the Indian Ocean and the now conceivable - if still unlikely - option of Japan going nuclear worry Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang.

But except for North Korea these nations, are not speaking up loudly, and Japan’s “normalization” appears to be more successful than it ever has been. Bush’s insistence on the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq is yet another fait accompli. China and South Korea are reluctant to overtly threaten Japan’s over its buildup, in large part due to a general Asian acquiescence to all fronts of the War on Terror.

What Iraq and the fait accompli style of policy have shown in the past six months is that those opposed will reciprocate with ill will. Witness France and Germany’s juvenile refusal to contribute significantly to the rebuilding of Iraq. Look, too, at Russia’s bloody nose in wake of the disposal of the ABM treaty - it is the reason, after all, that Moscow opposed the war in Iraq.

A Japanese military made stronger and more expansive through fait accompli style policy making will only poison the relationships between Japan and its neighbors. These binds are already tenuous and lacking in genuine friendship. Even incorrectly perceived ill will is still ill will. Absent a U.S. presence in the region, it is anyone’s guess as to whether the region will remain stable. I am rather pessimistic.

President Bush needs to let Japan know that he chooses Tokyo - and Beijing and Seoul and even Pyongyang - and that its military services are not required. Too much is at risk in East Asia to provide the President with a false sense of internationalization of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.