The death of a major political figure shortly before an iportant election can dramatically affect its outcome. Sympathy for the deceased galvanizes supporters and moves fence-sitting independents to support his (or her) cause. There is a recent precedent for this in European politics. In 2002, a radical environmentalist assassinated maverick Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, an advocate of a blend of economic liberalism and anti-immigration politics, just as his party was about to stand in national parliamentary elections for the first time. In the elections, his party, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), performed above all expectations and landed a place in the conservative governing coalition. This feat is all the more remarkable when one considers that Fortuyn was the only well-known figure in his party, while his successors completely lacked any political experience.

In Sweden recently, many expected this pattern to repeat itself. The main advocate of the “yes” side in the referendum on joining the euro, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, was tragically murdered days before the vote. (It is still not clear if the crime was politically motivated.) However, this did not affect the result of the vote; the “no” side won decisively, as polls taken before Lindh’s killing predicted.

Why did this happen? There are several potential reasons. One could argue that there are differences between the Swedish and Dutch electorates that result in different responses to unexpected tragic events. However, this is unlikely. Although there are important differences between Sweden and the Netherlands (most obviously on social issues, where the Dutch are far more liberal) Sweden and the Netherlands have very similar political models. They both focus on consensus-based politics; loud dissent from mainstream opinion is discouraged.

Perhaps it is the case that Fortuyn and Lindh are different sorts of political figures, and so their deaths had different effects. Fortuyn was a maverick who delighted in challenging mainstream opinion and passionately addressing issues such as immigration in a way previously taboo in Dutch politics. This gained him passionate support from groups alienated from the political process (particularly young people) who became emotionally invested in Fortuyn and his cause. Therefore, his death aroused intense reaction in an already intensely dedicated section of the electorate. It is no doubt the case that Lindh’s death caused intense emotional reactions as well, but as a mainstream politician she hardly had the same sort of following as Fortuyn. This may explain the smaller electoral effect of her death.

However, the most important cause for the failure of the euro referendum was a fundamental disconnect between the EU and the Swedish public. Swedes have always been suspicious of the EU; they only joined in 1994 after a close referendum. A main cause of this suspicion is the EU’s “democratic deficit,” a result of the fact that unelected officials are responsible for most EU policymaking. These concerns have increased since the recent European constitutional convention, which came in for criticism for its lack of consultation with the European electorate before producing a final document. The exit polling shows that concern over these issues was the top reason why Swedes voted no on the referendum. Even the death of a top political figure could not counter the effect of this popular skepticism.

The failure of the euro in Sweden is a major setback for European integration. It has effectively ruled out similar referendums in Denmark and the UK for the foreseeable future. If supporters of expanding the EU’s role do not do more to resolve the “democratic deficit”, they will be in for a nasty surprise when member states hold votes on the EU constitution in the future.